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Case No. 18133 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants filed su~t in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, in and for Grand County, against the defen-
dant to recover for damages to theii personal property which 
damage they allege was caused by the negligence of the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants' statement of the disposition of this 
matter in the lower court is accurate and adopted by 
respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court, and the verdict found by the jury, and ask that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the verdict be remanded with instructions to the lower court 
to enter a verdict in favor of the appellants on the question 
of negligence and to enter a judgment for the stipulated 
amount of damages. Appellants also ask that the action be 
remanded to the lower court for a trial on the issue of lost 
prof its and on any other non-stipulated damages. 
In the alternative, appellants request a new trial 
on all issues not stipulated to previously by the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts out of which this case arises are that 
the appellants, while operating a business for the logging of 
uranium and other ore materials, for various mineral com-
panies, had a specially-equipped van destroyed, along with 
its contents, by a fire on or about June 28, 1979. 
The fire took place in a remote area south of Moab, 
Utah at approximately 8:45 9:m· 
Prior to the'day of the incident, the plaintiffs 
had experienced difficulty with the;~van, since its purchase 
on March 18, 1979. The operators of the van had complained 
that the van had a tendency to "cut out" and overheat. 
After experiencing that difficulty for some period of time, 
they brought the vehicle to the defendant's place of busi-
ness, requesting repair. 
The vehicle was brought to the defendant's garage on 
the morning of June 28, 1979 and the repair and the evaluation 
of the problem was handled by one of defendant's employees, 
-2-
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Mr. Allen Simon. Mr. Simon testified that the vehicle was 
suffering from three potential problems (T. 237). He deter-
mined that there was foreign material in the fuel filter 
which was precluding the flow of fuel to the carburetor. He 
testified that there had been a lot of complaints of vehicles 
"cutting out" and the problem was created by a lot of "dirty 
gas" around the Moab area. Mr. Simon testified that he re-
placed the fuel filter, with its accompanying gasket, and 
the connecting hose, and found no leaks to the system. 
(T. 242.) 
In addition, he found that the overheating could 
have been possibly caused by a large obstruction, a tire, 
mounted to the front of the vehicle, which inhibited the flow 
of air and cooling of the engine. In addition, he found that 
the ignition system had been altered from that installed by 
the factory and he was ·unable to .attempt any testing of the 
ignition system because of.the modification. (T. 238.) 
Plaintiffs refused to allow any additional work to 
, ... 
be done as it related to the emission and cooling systems 
because of time commitments on the job. (T. 243.) 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs' employees picked up the 
van and drove the van to the drilling site approximately 30 
miles south of Moab. Their trip to the logging site was un-
eventful and their movement of the vehicle between logging 
holes was without incident. As they began to return from 
the site, their first indication of a problem as indicated 
-3-
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by the driver, was "the strong smell of gasoline when we started 
down the hill." (T. 85.} They continued to descend down the 
hill at a very slow speed due to the rocky surface, for up to 
two minutes. It was at this point that they heard a "popping" 
sound and discovered the existence of a fire coming from 
under the wheel wells. The driver and passenger then attempted 
to extinguish the flames in the engine by opening the hood 
and throwing dirt and rocks onto the engine. No attempt was 
made to secure or find a fire extinguisher and what was 
initially a fire around the carburetor resulted in the total 
and complete destruction of the van and its contents. (T. 89.) 
INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF FIRE 
various opinions were offered at the time of trial 
to answer the question as to the cause of the fire. Plain-
tiffs called an engineer by the name of Mr. Robert J. Cald-
• 
well who testified that' he ex~mined the van several months 
. . 
after the fire as it was parked in a salvage yard in Moab. 
He indicated that the vehicle had b~en salvaged and much of 
the van and equipment had been carried off. He concluded, 
following his examination, that the fire was fuel fed and 
concluded that the fire had been caused by the repair work 
done by Peterson Ford. It was not until several months after 
his examination and observations that he finally concluded 
that the defendant had failed to install a gasket with the 
fuel filter at the time of the repair. However, at the time 
of trial he indicated that his conclusions were based upon 
-4-
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probabilities and he could only assign his conclusion an 80 
percent probability. The remaining probabilities were that 
the engine malfunctioned and that the fire was created or 
caused by ignition of excessive fuel in the carburetor. (T. 
96-155). 
Defendant called two expert witnesses who both 
testified that under circumstances where there is dust and 
debris or small particles in the fuel which have escaped the 
filter, that there is a probability that the needles and 
seats of the carburetor had malfunctioned and an ex-
cess of gas is allowed to build up in the carburetor. 
This situation coupled with the bouncing and jostling of the 
vehicle would cause the gasoline to "slosh" out onto the 
manifold, thus causing ignition and a fire. Both of defen-
dant's experts, one a mechanical engineer and another a 
• 
master mechanic, testified that more than likely the fuel 
smelled by the driver and the passenger immediately prior to 
the fire was created by the buildup*·pf gas in the carburetor 
which subsequently ignited. (T.269-280; T.288-315). 
The question of the comparable negligence of the 
plaintiffs and the defendant was given to the jury and the 
jury returned a special verdict finding the plaintiffs 86 
percent at fault for the injury and damage they sustained 
and the defendant only 14 percent responsible for the same. 
The court thereafter entered a judgment, no cause of action, 
and the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial which was 
denied. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE WAS SUPPORTED BY 
MORE THAN ADEQUATE EVIDENCE ON THE QUES-
TION OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
Throughout plaintiffs' entire brief, they have 
selected, erroneously, the basis for the jury's finding and 
verdict in this case. They have attempted to demonstrate to 
this court that there is only one basis upon which the jury 
was able or capable of finding the plaintiffs negligent. 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that the jury 
relied upon one of the acts of negligence of the plaintiffs, 
more than any of the other acts. Plaintiffs have also thus 
erroneously characterized the trial tactic of the defendant 
and in particular its closing argument in this case. Plain-
tiffs specifically indicate that "the only facts argued by 
• 
defense counsel during ·closing argument to prove that plain-
tiffs were comparativeiy negligent were facts relating to 
the plaintiffs' failure to have a f~re extinguisher in the 
van and the plaintiffs' company policy that fire extinguishers 
should be placed in each van for safety purposes." {P. 49 
Appellants' Brief.) That statement, being fatally incorrect, 
is a misstatement of the proceedings of the trial in this 
case. It should be recognized by plaintiffs' counsel that 
defendant's closing argument was only a statement of the 
facts as seen by counsel and was not necessarily representa-
tive of all facts upon which the jury made their findings. 
-6-
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On page 385 of the transcript in this matter, counsel's 
argument as to plaintiffs smelling the gasoline prior to the 
ignition or explosion is clear and proffered for the jury's 
consideration. 
In reviewing a court's ruling on a Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and a subsequent Motion for a New Trial, 
it has been this court's position: 
In reviewing the trial court's rulings per-
taining to motions for a directed verdict 
or judgment N.O.V., this court reviews the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and to afford him the bene-
fits of all inferences which the evidence 
fairly supports. If reasonable persons 
could reach different conclusions on the 
issue in controversy, a jury question 
exists and the motion should be denied. 
McLoud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Ut. 1977). 
Keeping this pronouncement in mind, let us consi-
• 
der the position taken by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert 
that the only evidence:considered by the jury as to the 
negligence of the plaintiffs had to.do with their failure to 
~~ 
equip their van with a fire extinguisher. Respondent takes 
the position that singular act of negligence in and of itself 
was sufficient for the jury's finding but certainly was not 
the only basis for their finding. Duringpthe cross-examin-
ation of Mr. Shaw, a part-owner and employee of the plaintiffs' 
business, the circumstances immediately prior and during 
the fire were examined. Mr. Shaw testified that after 
completing the day's work they had started on their way home 
-7-
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and driven a mile or two which took approximately ten minutes. 
The reason the going was so slow was because of the very 
rough and steep terrain which they were required to traverse. 
{T. 84.) Mr. Shaw was then asked, 
"What is the first thing you noticed 
coming down the hill that seemed out 
of the ordinary?" 
He responded, 
"The strong smell of gasoline when we 
started down the hill." {Emphasis added) 
{T. 85.) Mr. Shaw was then asked: 
Q. How long did you smell the gasoline 
before the popping sound? I would like 
you to think really hard about this. How 
long did you smell the gasoline before you 
heard the popping sound? 
A. I would say about a minute or two. (Emphasis added) 
Q. A minute or two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were _traveling down this steep 
terrain, and going less_ than five miles an 
hour in less than· a minute or two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Gates about this? 
Did you say, "We've got to stop," or "We've 
got to check this out and see what the pro-
blem is"? 
A. I had it in my mind that I was going to 
stop at the bottom of the hill and check it 
out. But I don't remember saying anything 
to Jim. 
Q. But the smell was strong enough that it 
created some concern to the extent that you 
were going to stop at the bottom of the hill? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 86, 87.) 
-8-
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Mr. Shaw went on to testify that after a minute or 
two elapsed from the time that he noticed the strong smell of 
gasoline, he heard a "pop." He characterizes the pop as 
something similar to a tire blowing out. He then saw flames 
coming out from under the wheel well and jumped out of the 
van. When asked whether he turned the engine off, he 
answered that he was not sure that he turned the engine off 
but he was sure that he placed the vehicle in "park," and 
put the emergency brake on. (T. 86.) Mr. Shaw and Mr. 
Gates, employees and owners of the plaintiffs' vehicle, 
subsequently attempted to put the fire out by opening the 
hood and throwing dirt and rocks on the engine where the 
flame was centered. Their efforts were futile and eventually 
they stood back and watched the van be consumed by the flames. 
(T. 86-88.) 
Clearly, the actions of. Mr. Shaw, the driver of the 
vehicle, demonstrate a:factual situation which reasonable persons 
could differ on their conclusions as to his negligence 
... 
and causation of the actual fire. For the sake of argument, 
we will assume for a minute that the eventual fire was 
created by the existence of fuel in the engine compartment, 
either from the fuel filter or from the carburetor itself. 
In this circumstance, it is clear that at the point Mr. Shaw 
first noticed the existence of the "strong smell of gasoline" 
he had up to two minutes to stop his vehicle and investigate 
the source of the gasoline. It is clear that the jury, 
-9-
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given the total factual circumstance as indicated in the 
record, coupled with the terrain involved and the prior 
problems encountered by the plaintiffs, could and did find 
that the plaintiffs themselves were negligent to a degree 
greater than that of the defendant. It is certainly reason-
able for a person to reach the conclusion that if Mr. Shaw had 
responded to his concerns about the smell of gasoline prior 
to the actual ignition or "popping" that there probably 
would have been no fire, explosion or damage to the engine 
or any other portion of the van. Mr. Shaw himself admits 
that he had it in his "mind" that he was going to "stop at 
the bottom of the hill and check it out." His delay of one 
or two minutes under the circumstances was the actual and 
proximate cause of the fire and explosion and eventual 
destruction of the van, etc. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' 
" 
Motion for a Directed Veridct was proper and mandated. In 
addition, its denial of the plainti~fs' Motion for a New 
Trial was proper and was not an abuse of discretion inasmuch 
as the evidence clearly supported the finding of negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs. 
In the plaintiffs' attempt to direct the court's 
attention to one isolated argument, they have missed some of 
the critical evidence offered at the time of trial, out of 
the mouth of their own witness. 
-10-
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There is additionally other evidence that was 
offered at the time of trial from which the jury, acting as 
reasonable persons, could conclude that the plaintiffs were 
negligence. It was the plaintiffs who did not allow a more 
in-depth examination and evaluation of their vehicular prob-
lems on the day of the incident. Mr. Allen Simon testified 
that it was his finding that there were three possible prob-
lems with the vehicle that were creating the symptoms 
experienced by Mr. Shaw and Mr. Gates. He testified that he 
undertook to correct one of them, the possible fuel filter 
problem, but was precluded from doing further work on the 
ignition system or the cooling system. His testimony on the 
matter is as follows: 
Q. What happened, Mr. Simon, after you 
finished.checking the filter and the fuel 
line to see whether it leaked? 
A. I went to the service manager, Mr. 
Charles Lovingood·,~ and explained to him 
that the two~things that I thought were 
wrong with the van. One being a possible 
malfunction in the electronic ignition. 
Also, an inability to test the ignition. 
And also I believe the overheating problem 
was probably caused by a very large spare 
tire winch assembly on the extended bumper, 
which was mounted directly in front of the 
radiator. 
Q. Now, tell us a little bit about this 
ignition system, if you would. First of 
all, explain to us where it was located 
on the engine, and as it related to the 
carburetor system that we had been talk-
ing about. 
A. Okay, the ignition coil is located 
approximately right here, and the distri-
-11-
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(T. 243.) 
butor right here. They are both in front 
of the carburetor. The ignition control 
box control module is what they call it, 
is mounted up on the fire wall of the 
vehicle over here on the van, as visual-
ized in the relation there. 
The factory wiring harness and ignition 
control box had been removed, and an acces-
sory unit had been put in or substituted, 
which consisted of some unshielded versus 
the stock factory shielded connection to 
the coil. 
Q. Can you explain what you mean by 
"unshielded?" 
A. It was not insulated. They were just 
baked, ah, light strips of copper wire and 
a little thumb screw that hooked the wires 
together. It was not a slip-on wire that 
is shielded against moisture and shortening, 
type system. They were unshielded and were 
just bare connections. 
Q. Did you have any involvement with the 
van after having this conversation with 
Mr. Charles Lovingood? 
A. No, he came back to me and said, aThey 
don't have the time to have any of these 
things done. The vehicle has to be out in 
the field, so they are going to pick it up. 
So just put it out in the sidewalk." (Emphasis added) 
It is reasonable to conclude that the jury addi-
tionally found that the plaintiffs were negligent in their 
refusal to have the vehicle completely and properly inspected 
and evaluated on the day it was brought into the defendant's 
facility. If for instance, the jury concluded by the evi-
dence offered, which is clearly demonstrated in the testimony 
offered by Mr. Lovingood (T. 272-285), that the ignition 
-12-
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system was related to the problems being experienced by the 
plaintiffs, then their refusal to have that ignition system 
tested or modified requires a finding of negligence. Due to 
the fact that no one is certain as to the cause of the fire, 
[plaintiffs' own expert was willing to assign only 80 percent 
to his opinion,] then the jury was allowed to form their own 
opinion, based upon the evidence offered, as to how the fire 
was actually created. 
The record in the specific parts indicated above 
demonstrates that there is more than sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding in this matter, even without 
considering the question of the lack of a fire extinguisher. 
As this court has stated: 
In reviewing a trial court's exercise of 
discretion upon a motion for a new trial, 
this Court examines the record to deter-
mine whether the evidence to support the 
verdict was complet~ly lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the ver-
dict plainly.unreasonable and unjust. If 
there be an evidentiary basis for the 
jury's decision the deniai of the new trial 
must be affirmed. (Emphasis added). 
McLoud v. Baum, supra, p. 1127. 
As is indicated above, plaintiffs erroneously 
. 
choose for the jury which fact it relied upon in answering 
the special verdict. Plaintiffs' brief emphasizes, and 
appropriately so, that plaintiffs themselves recognized a 
standard of care in their industry but due to only time pres-
sures, allowed themselves to breach that duty to themselves. 
-13-
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Mr. Shaw, a part-owner of plaintiffs' business, 
stated on cross-examination that it was standard procedure, 
which is what the normal cautious person would do under like 
circumstances, to have a fire extinguisher on the vehicle. 
The pertinent part of that questioning went as follows: 
Q. You had an interest in that van, and 
the contents of the van, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was expensive equipment in the 
van? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I think "sophisticated" has been the 
word that has been used, but it was expen-
sive equipment in the van, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever made any attempt to get a 
fire extinguisher for that van? 
A. Well, it was-standard practice to• have 
one in our vans. B-µt it was a new van. We 
just hadn't got ~round to putting on in it 
yet. · 
Q. You hadn't put a fire_-~extinguisher in 
it yet? 
A. No. (T. 90.) 
Q. Okay. But it's your testimony at this 
time, that it's standard procedure to have 
fire extinguishers on this type.of vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what would be the purpose for hav-
ing a fire extinguisher on a van like this? 
A. Just safety reasons. 
Q. You heard Mr. Gates testify that he 
felt like at one time you might have con-
tained the fire, is that correct you 
heard him testify as to that? 
-14-
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A. Yes, I heard him. 
Q. Did you have the same thought at any 
time? 
A. Well, when I first saw it, I thought 
we could put it out. (T. 91.) 
Q. Is it your opinion that if you have 
had a fire extinguisher, you would have 
been able to put that fire out, initially? 
A. It's hard to say. 
Q. But there is a pretty good chance that 
you could have though. 
A. Yes I think we had a chance. 
Q. And you would have put it out at that 
point, the point that we are talking about, 
you would have just had an engine fire, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Plaintiffs take the position that the failure to 
have a fire extinguisher on the van could not be a factor in 
• 
apportioning negligence. Plainti~fs admit that they cannot 
find any case law to support the argument but attempt to draw 
an analogy between the case at bar and those controversies 
existing over seatbelts and the negligence to be attributed 
to the non-user. The plaintiffs state in their brief on page 
15 that "the seatbelt law is overwhelming to the effect that 
a plaintiff's failure to use a provided seatbelt cannot be 
used to bar his recovery." However, the cases cited are those 
cases which follow the contributory negligence rule and the 
harsh remedy imposed by that law differs from the philosophy 
-15-
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of comparative negligence. 
With the adoption of comparative negligence in 
Utah, Utah adopted a fault concept that apportions liability 
for damages in proportion to the contribution of each tort-
feasor causing the injury or damage. Simply speaking, the 
comparative negligence concept suggests that every person is 
and should be responsible to another to the extent he caused 
the injury or damage. See Heft & Heft Comparative Negligence 
Manual, §1.240. 
When comparative negligence is applied, it abro-
gates contributory negligence, thus the result need not be 
an all-or-nothing situation. With the change was ingested 
into the procedures a blending of contributory negligence 
with other common law defenses into an aggregate of all the 
negligence into the apportionment question. In particular 
• 
was the abolition of the assumption.or risk defense. 
With the aboiiti6n of assumption of 
the risk, the doctrine of active and 
passive negligence arose ~n the en-
tire comparative negligence concept. 
Active negligence is contributory 
negligence which by its nature is the 
basis of liability and could be a 
bar to recovery. Passive negligence 
is the commission or omission of a 
negligent act that could reduce 
damage or injury but could never be 
the basis of liability. 
Heft & Heft, supra, §1.240 at 47. 
Plaintiffs suggest that seatbelt cases most closely 
parallel the instant matter. This reasoning appears to be in 
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error. The closest cases for comparison have to do with the 
Guest versus Host cases. 
When the guest's exposure of himself 
to a particular hazard is unreasonable, 
or he fails to exercise ordinary care 
for his own safety, such conduct is 
negligence, and is subject to the 
comparative negligence statute. 
Obviously, a guest could be actively 
negligent and cause a collision. 
Examples might be where the guest 
would interfere with the operation of 
the vehicle; or where he might fail 
to look under circumstances when he 
was actively engaged in assisting the 
operation of the vehicle such as in 
the fog; or he might fail to warn un-
der certain circumstances, or be acti-
vely negligent in some act or omission 
that was a cause of the collision. 
On the other hand, the guest might be 
passively negligent by riding with a 
host driver whose known habits and 
lack of skill presented a hazard. 
Another example would be where the 
guest failed to wear a seatbelt.• Such 
negligence would not be a cause of 
the collision but might be a cause of 
the injuries suffered by the guest from 
such hazard. 
,~ 
. • • As the doctrine developed, the 
court consistently held that a person 
riding in a vehicle driven by another 
was under a duty to exercise such 
care as the ordinary prudent person 
would exercise under similar circum-
.stances to avoid injury to.himself. 
A test of the guest's negligence was 
whether under the circumstances he 
acted with the care that a reasonable 
prudent man would have exercised under 
those circumstances. The rule under 
comparative negligence in Wisconsin 
is that a person riding in a vehicle 
driven by another is under the duty 
of exercising such care as an ordinary 
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prudent person would exercise under 
similar circumstances to avoid injury 
to himself. Negligence of a guest is 
his failure to exercise ordinary care 
for his own safety. 
Heft & Heft, supra, §1.240 at 47-48. 
The concept of active and passive negligence was 
explained by Mr. Chief Justice Hallows of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, in a case where he said: 
By the term "passive negligence" we include 
conduct of a guest in failing to use ordin-
ary care for his own safety in entering the 
car or in riding with the host when knowing 
of a hazard, whether the hazard be a condi-
tion of the car, the condition of the 
driver, his lack of skill, or any other 
hazard. Such negligence may contribute to 
or be a cause of the guest's injury or may 
not, depending on the facts of the accident 
and the conduct of the host, but such 
negligence is not a cause of the collision 
nor the accident. In such a case, the 
collision or accident may be termed the 
immediate cause or conduct through which 
the negligence of the host or other driver, 
or both caused the inju~ies to the guest. 
If a cause of the accident is related to 
the hazard iri respect to which the guest 
was negligent, such passive negligence of 
the guest is a contributing cause of his 
injuries. Active negligence on the part 
of a guest in failing to exercise ordinary 
care for his own safety consists of his 
acts or omissions which directly may be a 
cause of the accident or collision, e.g., 
interference with the operation of the 
car or its operator. 
Thiesen v. Milwaukee Auto Ins., 118 N.W.2d 140 (Wis., 1962). 
Some jurisdictions have not liked the passive and 
active label used in the process of comparing fault, but have 
followed the same basic reasoning as enunciated above. A 
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recent holding of the Alaska Supreme Court closely paralells 
the reasoning being espoused by respondent in the instant mat-
ter. In the case of State of Alaska v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 
(Alaska, 1977), the Alaska Supreme Court held that in compar-
ative negligence cases what is being compared is negligent 
conduct, fault or culpability not causation, either physical 
or legal. 572 P.2d at 782. 
The Kaatz case involved a suit against the State of 
Alaska for the death of the plaintiff's husband who was killed 
while riding on a frontend loader which overturned on an icy 
highway. The plaintiff alleged that the death resulted from 
the defendant, State's, failure to properly maintain and sand 
the highway. The State alleged that the decedent's own 
negligence contributed to his death, "Because he knew the 
hazardous condition of the highway and the extremely unstable 
operating characteristics of the machine on which he was riding." 
The Court, iri summarizing the facts as demonstrated 
at the time of trial, indicated that the decedent Kaatz, had 
- .... 
driven the section of the highway in question before riding 
as a passenger on the loader. The trial court found that 
Kaatz was familiar with the characteristics of the loader 
and knew the conditions of the road, and the company policy 
forbidding persons to ride as passengers on the loader. 
The trial Court, by jury verdict, returned a finding 
that the State was 85 percent negligent, and Kaatz, 15 percent 
negligent, even though he was not the operator of the vehicle, 
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but merely a passenger at the time of the incident. The 
state, however, contended that the decedeant, Kaatz should 
have been found at least 50 percent responsible for his 
injuries and damages. The State's argument was made in the 
context of active and passive negligence, and the Alaska 
Supreme Court reasoned as follows: 
'The State asserts that Kaatz was actively 
negligent and the State passively negligent, 
and therefore as a matter of law, the 
greater percent of negligence must be assigned 
to Kaatz. The State takes the active/passive 
concept from factual context different from 
this one. It is not clear that the State's 
negligence should be classified as passive, 
and Kaatz as active. In any event, we see 
little to be gained in importing the active/ 
passive distinction in the comparison of 
negligence. one of the virtues of comparative 
negligence is its greater flexibility. 
See Schwartz, supra, §21-2 at 340. Introducing 
various standards and concepts from other 
areas of tort law, and creating from them 
rigid rules to use in comparing negli~ence 
would destroy. much of that flexibility ••• 
~ 
• • • We cannot offer specific quidelines on 
how to compare negligence. Every case must 
turn on its own facts. The trier of fact, 
whether judge or jury mus~ apply its ordinary 
human experience to the facts revealed by the 
evidence.· 
As the Supreme Court of Alaska so clearly stated, 
even though it found the concepts of active and passive in-
appropriate, the comparison to be made under comparative 
negligence statutes is conduct, fault, or culpability not 
causation, either physical or legal. see also, Pann Alaska 
Fisheries Inc., vs. Marine Construction and Design Co., 402 
F.2d 1187 (W.D. Washington, 1975); v. Schwartz, Comparative 
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Negligence §17.1 a~ 276. 
The Courts, whether using the active or passive 
distinction, or simply following the rationale used by the 
Alaska Court, have made it clear that the negligence of the 
injured party, where it was not the proximate cause of the 
accident, could not be used in determining responsibility 
for injuries to third persons. However, the negligent con-
duct of the injured party should and has to be used to deter-
mine the extent of relief extended to the injured party. 
In line with this reasoning is a jury finding that 
makes the injured or damaged party respond for his own negli-
gence which was not the actual cause of producing the 
occurrence but added solely to extend the injured party's 
damages. This appears to be the dilemma the court was faced 
with in the instant matter as it related to apportionment 
' 
of negligence. In the disct.J.ssion _- that took place, on the 
record in chambers, it. was clear that the court was strug-
gling with the question of comparative negligence under the 
circumstances presented by this case. In fact, the court 
considered at one point whether the appropriate principle 
of law to be mitigation. That consideration was abandoned 
inasmuch as it did not appropriately apply to the tort 
concepts being considered nor was the jury being given an 
opportunity to determine damages and thus, make a determin-
ation as to what point damages should be cut off for plain-
tiffs' failure to act prudently. The court could clearly 
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see from the evidence that whatever the causation, the fire 
would have caused such nominal or minimal damages had not 
the plaintiffs been negligent in their duty to protect them-
selves and their property. In addition, as pointed out by 
the court in its ruling, there was more than one alleged 
negligent act from which the jury would be making a determ-
ination. The Court stated: 
But I think it's a legitimate matter and 
can be handled by both of you in your argu-
ments in having it considered as one of the 
negligent acts, if it is considered to be a 
negligent act by the jury that affects some 
portion of the damages, possibly. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(T.340-242). 
The Court's ultimate position on the question is 
illustrated by the Special Verdict given to the jury for 
• 
making its determination. Question.No. 5 of the Special 
verdict reads as follows: 
If you have answered all of the previous 
questions "yes," then and* ... only then are you 
to answer this question. 
Taking the combined negligence that caused the 
damage as 100 percent (100%}, what percentage 
of that negligence was attributable to plaintiffs 
and what percentage was attributable to the 
defendant. (Emphasis added.) · 
The question clearly illustrated that the negligence 
to be compared was that conduct which caused the damage, not 
that which created the fire. The jury properly responded 
by apportioning the negligence, or the culpability or fault 
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of both parties as the evidence dictated. 
The folly in plaintiffs' position comes from the 
fact that they have misconstrued the evidence offered as 
being only one possible act of negligence on the part of the 
plaintiffs. When the evidence and the record is viewed in a 
light most favorable to the respondent, and affording the 
respondent the benefit of all inferences which the evidence 
fairly supports, it is obvious that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' Motion for a New 
Trial or a directed verdict on the grounds of insufficiency 
of evidence. See Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 
497 P.2d 236 (Utah 1972). 
POINT II. 
THE OBVIOUS EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR 
THE JURY VERDICT REQUIRES THAT 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW 
BE AFFIRMED. 
Plaintiffs claim, in their Second Point on Appeal, 
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the plain-
tiffs a new trial based on his clai~ of insufficiency of 
evidence to justify the jury's verdict. Once again, the 
totality of their argument is that defense counsel only argued 
one act of negligence to the jury upon which the jury could 
make a finding. 
The arguments made in Point I of this Brief are re-
iterated briefly. First, defendant's counsel argued more 
than one act of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and 
accordingly the second point of their appeal is erroneous. 
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secondly, even if only one act is argued before the jury, it 
did not bind the jury to a consideration of that one act of 
negligence only. As Judge Ballif stated in his decision on 
plaintiff's motion for a Directed Verdict the jury was entitled 
to consider the fire extinguisher question, as "one" of the 
negligent acts. 
This Court's decision in the matter of Smith v. 
Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah, 1976), clearly states the con-
trolling rule of law: 
'It must be kept in mind that the granting or 
refusing to grant a new trial is largely a 
matter of discretion with the trial judge, 
and this court will reverse the trial 
court only for an abuse of discretion in 
the refusal. 
551 P.2d at 1262. 
In the case of McLoud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (1977), 
• 
this Court was also asked to reve~se the lower's Court decision 
denying a motion for a:new trial. In that particular case, 
this Court concluded that there was.nothing in the record to 
, ... 
support the plaintiff's claim that there was an abuse of 
discretion since there was an evidentiary foundation for the 
jury verdict. 
The court further announced that: 
In reviewing denials of motions for 
a direct verdict, judgment, N.o.v., 
or in the alternative for a new 
trial, this court must view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion was made. 
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In reviewing a trial court's exercise 
of discretion upon a motion for a new 
trial, this Court examines the record 
to determine whether the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely 
lacking, or was so slight and uncon-
vincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. If there be 
an evidentiary basis for the jury's 
decision, then denial of the new trial 
must be affirmed.· 
It is clear from the record and the inferences 
which the evidence fairly supports that the questions of 
negligence and the comparability of negligence were ones 
which were jury questions, and the jury accordingly ruled. 
As in the McLoud case, it is clear that there is nothing, 
nor is anything proffered by the plaintiff's to substantiate 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COU~T'S DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR LOST PROFITS WAS 
PROPER INASMUCH AS THE PLAINTIFFS' HAD 
FAILED TO MEET THEIR B~RDEN OF PROOF 
ON THAT SUBJECT 
The question of damages is a moot subject if this 
Court affirms the decision of the court and jury below. 
However, defendant feels that at least some discussion is 
required relating to appellant's third point. Point III of 
Appellant's Brief urges this Court to find that the trial 
court committed error in granting defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict as it applied to plaintiffs' claim for loss 
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of profits. once again, a reflection to the record points 
out that plaintiffs' failed to meet their burden by establi-
shing those damages to a reasonable certainty necessary for 
the court to allow the matter to be considered by the jury. 
A general statement of the law is found in the case of How-
arth v. ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah, 1973), wherein the 
Court stated: 
The problem as to when and under 
what circumstances damages may be 
recovered for loss in operating a 
business is, as is true in so many 
controversial areas of the law, 
a coin that has at least two sides 
to it. The basic and general rule 
is that the loss of anticipated 
prof its of a business venture involve 
so many factors of uncertainty that 
ordinary prof its to be realized in 
the future are too speculative to 
base an award of damages thereon. 
The other side of the coin is that 
damages to a business or enterprise 
need only be proved with sufficient 
certainty that reasonable minds 
might believe from a· preponderance 
of evidence that the damages were 
actually suffered. 
515 P.2d at 445. 
It appears that the qualifying factor in finding 
loss profits is "sufficient cetainty." 
In this case being reviewed, the record is re-
plete with numerous statements by plaintiffs' witnesses which 
clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs' them selves felt no 
certainty as to the profits being claimed. Their apparent 
lack of certainty clearly justified the Court's 
' 
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finding that there was nothing for the jury to rely upon in 
making an award of such damages. Mr. Cantor, plaintiffs' 
witness as to the lost prof its claim, when testifying con-
cerning the purported contracts and work the plaintiffs were 
to complete for Amoco Minerals, responded to questioning as 
follows: 
Q: Now, you testify that on October 10, 
1979, you received a contract for the 
New Mexico Job and that you signed it. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you aware of the Alzada job prior 
to that time. 
A: Yes 
Q: And had you made this verbal bid: 
A: At that time I signed the contract I 
had two bids with Amoco 
Q: And what are your understandings as to 
the size of _those jobs. 
A: It was my~understanding the Alzada job 
was considerably larger. 
Q: Did you make any~·~attempt to contact 
Steve Lewis prior to signing that contract 
to see if you were being considered for the 
other job? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what did he say? 
A: I can't remember specifically, I think 
I told him that I needed to accept the 
Lordsburg job because we had only one truck 
available, or that our second truck had not 
been completed yet. We were asked if we would 
do the work, and we said yes, and we would 
accept the job, but this was before the analysis 
was final on the Alzada job. 
-27-
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(T. 224-225.) 
Q: Are you telling me that you knew the 
Alzada job would be bigger and would bring more 
prof it to you and you elected to take the New 
Mexico job anyway. 
A: Well, we didn't have any certainty at all 
that we would have got the bid on the Alzada 
job. So rather than pass up an opportunity to 
work on the one month job in New Mexico, we 
accepted that work rather than risk loosing both 
jobs. 
Q: And you are telling me though, that Mr. 
Lewis called you four days later and told you that 
you were their chosen company for doing the 
project? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In that conversation you had with Mr. Lewis 
prior to that time, didn't lead you to believe 
you were standing in a position to have the job 
should the contract be formalized. 
A: Well I felt I could have both jobs •••• 
Plaintiffs' uncertainty as to their future business 
in contracting is explained· hy their practice in bidding for 
more jobs than they could possibly handle. (T. 225.) 
In fact, when Mr. Cantor was asked concerning work 
that he had bid on for a unit which had not yet been completed, 
he made the following admissions: 
Q: Mr. Cantor did you just say that you 
entered into some contracts for the utilization 
of that unit that hadn't yet been completed? 
A: I hadn't entered into a contract formally, 
No. 
Q: What you are talking about--
A: We had accepted the offer of work. 
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(T. 232.) 
Q: Your term, "contract" is that the same 
term you are using with Mr. Lewis' type of 
arrangement? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But it's not a contract, right? 
A: No, it wasn't a signed contract. 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that the plain-
tiffs' practice was to try to line up enough work to keep 
their units busy, accordingly, their practice was to talk 
with any contractors on the basis of doing the work, when in 
fact they never considered their conversations to be in the 
nature of an agreement, or contract. In this particular 
case, the two contracts, which were the subject of plaintiffs' 
claim for lost profits were identified for the jury and the 
court as the July, 1979 contract, and the October 30, 1979 
contract. Mr. Cantor, during~cross_examination, indicated 
that these never became contracts, nor did he consider his 
conversations with the contractor b~nding upon the plaintiffs 
or the contractor. The questioning went as follows: 
Q: On which day did you sign the contract 
for the Amoco job that was scheduled to 
start in July, 1979. 
. 
A: I didn't sign the contract. 
Q: On which day did you sign the contract 
that was scheduled to start on October 30, 
1979 
A: I did not sign that contract. 
Q: Mr. Cantor, isn't it customarily the 
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practice that if you enter into a contract 
regarding doing work with these companies 
that there would be written contract? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And in this case, there were no written 
contracts. 
A: They were forthcoming. They ususally 
don't deliver the contracts until immediately 
before the work is to be done, customarily. 
Q: Okay, then until you sign that contract 
do you feel you are bound on those contracts. 
A: No. 
Q: Do you think Amoco Minerals was bound on 
the contract: 
A: No. 
(T. pp. 216 and 217.) 
The reason that Mr. Cantor had the uncertainty, as 
he described in the portion of the transcript extracted, was 
that the individual who he was dealing with from Amoco did not 
have the authority to bind Amoco, nor did he have the authority 
to contract with Acculog. 
•. 
Mr. Steven Lewis, an employee of Amoco Minerals, 
was plaintiffs' principal witness as to loss profits portion 
of their damages claim. In fact it was Mr. Lewis, upon which 
they relied for the claimed loss of profits, which would have 
resulted from the July, 1979, and the October 30, 1979 contracts 
However, on cross-examination, Mr. Lewis admitted that he was 
merely an exploration geologist and had no authority to bind 
Amoco Minerals to any contract, nor did he have authority to 
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make payments on contracts. That examination was as follows: 
(T. 186.) 
(T. 187.) 
Q: Can you sign contracts for Amoco 
Minerals. 
A: No. 
Q: Could you, between June and December, 
1979 sign contracts? 
A: No. 
Q: Isn't it also true that before any 
contract could be entered into with Amoco 
Minerals during this time, that he had to 
have the approval of Mr. Squyres? 
A: Yes. He had to sign the contract. 
Q: And isn't it also true that as a matter 
of procedure that contracts entered into 
with logging outfits were done on a written 
basis, a written formal basis? 
A: Contracts were written up, yes. 
Q: And at the bottom of those contracts, 
the contracting party for Amoco Minerals, 
Mr. Squyers would sign that contract? 
A: Yes.· 
.. 
.... 
Mr. Lewis went on to explain that after the bid 
proposals were prepared, one of which was that of the plain-
tiffs, they were presented to Mr. Squyres and he was the one 
that would make the decision as to the placement of the 
contract (T. 188.) 
No evidence was offered that Mr. Squyres approved 
any contract with the plaintiffs inasmuch as no contracts 
were ever signed between Amoco Minerals and the plaintiffs 
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regarding the two contracts. Mr. Lewis' entire testimony 
was based upon speculation of what Mr. Squyres would or 
would have not done, and no direct testimony was offered 
upon which the jury could rely in making their decision. 
This court has repeatedly indicated that the proof of loss 
profits must not be completely speculative, or uncertain. 
See, Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
309 P.2d 802 (1957). 
Plaintiffs' additional fatal flaw in the present-
ation of their claim for lost prof its is amplified by their 
brief on appeal. Their entire argument surrounds that par-
ticular evidence, which is demonstrated by the exhibits 
attached to the brief, of the costs incurred by Amoco Min-
erals to a separate contractor on the projects in question. 
That of fer of proof merely demonstrated the gross cost of 
• 
the project to Amoco Minerals, but failed to provide the 
jury with some ligitimate means of determining the proper 
measure of damages. In the case of .-~Flynn v. Schocker Con-
struction Co., ~59 P.2d 433 (Utah, 1969), the Court stated 
that a mere offer of the net profits on other jobs was: 
.•• entirely immaterial as the 
true rule of damages to which he would 
be entitled in case his contract was 
wrongfully breached would be the contract 
price less the amount of money he would have 
necessarily expended in completing 
the job." 
459 P.2d at 435. 
That same measure of damages is applicable in this 
-32-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case inasmuch as even if the contracts had been formed, the 
plaintiffs' entitlement would have been owing to the difference 
between the contract price and their cost of performing said 
contracts. During Mr. Cantor's cross-examination, he was 
unable to provide for the jury, or the Court, a figure which 
would be representative of his actual profit. (T. 227.) 
The bottom line of this discussion is that the 
jury found that the plaintiffs' negligence was greater than 
that of the defendants, and, accordingly, they were not 
entitled to any relief. However, the Court's ruling granting 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to lost profits 
was mandated by two important factors: 
(1) The fact that no contracts were ever entered 
into, nor was there any real reliance on those agreements by 
either the plaintiffs or the contractor. 
(2) The proof offe~ed as.lost profits, even if the 
contracts had been performed, were not sufficient for the 
court to allow the jury to speculat~ as to those alleged dam~ 
ages. Accordingly, the Court's ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It has always been the position of this court that 
upon review of a jury's verdict and finding, the evidence 
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion for a new trial is made. In this particular 
case, the jury, based upon numerous factors, concluded that 
the negligence of the plaintiffs was greater than that of 
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the defendant. To disrupt tha~ particular finding in the 
face of clearly sufficient evidence on the question of plain-
tiffs' comparative negligence would be unfair and unsupport-
able. To intrude upon that province of the jury would under-
mine participants in the judicial systems reliance upon the 
jury system, and the respect that it is entitled to in the 
dispute-settling process. Accordingly, defendant urges the 
Court to affirm the jury's verdict and the court's findings, 
including that of its verdict as to the lost profits question. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2._f day of 
September, 1982. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
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